So it really is a problem then . <3
Edmund Gettier presented two effective counterexamples to the JTB analysis.
I found the second one. I ll post the quote for all the ones who wish to join in this debate but have trouble finding data about it.
Consequently, the three conditions of the JTB account — truth, belief, and justification — are not sufficient for knowledge.
How must the analysis of knowledge be modified to make it immune to cases like the one we just considered?
This is what is commonly referred to as the "Gettier problem".
Epistemologists who think that the JTB approach is basically on the right track must choose between two different strategies for solving the Gettier problem.
The first is to strengthen the justification condition.
This was attempted by Roderick Chisholm.
The second strategy is to search for a suitable further condition, a condition that would, so to speak, "degettierize" justified true belief.
Edmund Gettier presented two effective counterexamples to the JTB analysis.
I found the second one. I ll post the quote for all the ones who wish to join in this debate but have trouble finding data about it.
1. Jones owns a Ford.
Suppose further Smith infers from (1) the following three disjunctions:
2. Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Boston.
3. Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona.
4. Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.
Since (1) entails each of the propositions (2) through (4), and since Smith recognizes these entailments, he is justified in believing each of propositions (2)-(4).
Now suppose that, by sheer coincidence, Brown is indeed in Barcelona.
Given these assumptions, we may say that Smith, when he believes (3), holds a justified true belief.
However, is Smith's belief an instance of knowledge?
Since Smith has no evidence whatever as to Brown's whereabouts, and so believes what is true only because of luck, the answer would have to be ‘no’.
Suppose further Smith infers from (1) the following three disjunctions:
2. Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Boston.
3. Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona.
4. Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.
Since (1) entails each of the propositions (2) through (4), and since Smith recognizes these entailments, he is justified in believing each of propositions (2)-(4).
Now suppose that, by sheer coincidence, Brown is indeed in Barcelona.
Given these assumptions, we may say that Smith, when he believes (3), holds a justified true belief.
However, is Smith's belief an instance of knowledge?
Since Smith has no evidence whatever as to Brown's whereabouts, and so believes what is true only because of luck, the answer would have to be ‘no’.
Consequently, the three conditions of the JTB account — truth, belief, and justification — are not sufficient for knowledge.
How must the analysis of knowledge be modified to make it immune to cases like the one we just considered?
This is what is commonly referred to as the "Gettier problem".
Epistemologists who think that the JTB approach is basically on the right track must choose between two different strategies for solving the Gettier problem.
The first is to strengthen the justification condition.
This was attempted by Roderick Chisholm.
The second strategy is to search for a suitable further condition, a condition that would, so to speak, "degettierize" justified true belief.